After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents
Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the attacker leaves, threats we term carryover attacks. Existing prompt-injection benchmarks evaluate attacks only in the session where malicious content is first observed, leaving the gate governing when and how often a planted payload later re-fires unmeasured. We present CarryoverBench: 12 personal-assistant scenarios and 101 attack tasks across three trigger channels: Instant, same-turn IPI; Autono...
| Authors | Zhiyue Xu, Xukai Wang, Zhiyuan Huang et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 20 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 20 October 2026 |
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