Exposing Vulnerability Monoculture Through Systemic Adversarial Robustness
Beneath the apparent diversity of foundation models lies an increasingly homogeneous technical stack of common training pipelines, distillation methods, and data. These shared algorithmic choices can expose an otherwise distinct model ecosystem to concentrated risks leading to a vulnerability monoculture. Yet current practice in assessing adversarial robustness is restricted to individual robustness scores and attack transfer rates, leaving open the unexplored fundamental question: how many attacks suffice for catastrophic widespread compromise? In this paper, we investigate the empirical nature of shared vulnerabilities within a model pool and introduce Systemic Adversarial Robustness (S...
| Authors | Leo Elmecker-Plakolm, Lukasz Szpruch, Avishek Joey Bose et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 19 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 19 October 2026 |
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