Game of Phones: Harnessing Game Theory and LLMs in 'Bot Wars' to Counteract Phone Scams
Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark...
| Authors | Nardine Basta, Robin Carpentier, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 19 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 19 October 2026 |
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