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Paper · arXiv

Training Natural Schemers: RL Can Amplify Oversight-Conditional Behavior

One of the central concerns for the safety of advanced AI is scheming: when a model strategically complies under oversight but pursues its own goals when unobserved. Current demonstrations, such as Anthropic's Alignment Faking work, depend on design choices that make them less convincing: explicit test-time prompting, handcrafted backdoors, or training data that demonstrates or hints at the target behavior. Model organisms built in this way cannot tell us whether scheming tendencies would arise or increase under realistic training conditions. We therefore construct a natural model organism of scheming, built on Kimi K2.6: trained with traits that could plausibly emerge in a frontier train...

AuthorsBart Jaworski, Nathaniel Mitrani, Fred Bruford et al.
Primary categorycs.AI
Published19 October 2026
Last updated at source19 October 2026
cs.AIcs.LG
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