Contracting with an Agent under Model Mismatch
In the classical principal-agent setting, the principal delegates some task to the agent, who receives a payment conditioned on the outcome of the task, which in turn benefits the principal. To align their objectives, the principal designs a contract that incentivizes the agent to take actions beneficial to the principal. In practice, however, the agent may act under misspecified beliefs about the underlying environment, leading to systematically suboptimal decisions. In this work, we study this problem through a principal-agent Markov Decision Process (PAMDP), in which the principal repeatedly interacts with an agent whose transition model may differ from the true environment dynamics. T...
| Authors | Elif Yılmaz, Jakub Tłuczek, Victor Villin et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.LG |
| Published | 16 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 16 October 2026 |
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