Decentralized LLM Workflows via Sequential Auctions
We present a scalable framework for solving multi-step tasks through a decentralized market of self-interested agents. Prior theoretical work demonstrated that agents organized through sequential auctions can converge to a globally optimal policy in a Markov decision process (MDP), but relied on the restrictive assumption of the existence of perfect clones as a model of perfect competition. In reality, exact clones drive agent profit to zero, violating the natural risk-reward incentives of participants. Conversely, we empirically demonstrate that the opposite extreme, absence of competition, also leads to market failure and value extraction collapse. Between these two extremes, we investi...
| Authors | Ian Gemp, Shubhendu Trivedi, Adam Fisch et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.GT |
| Published | 15 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 15 October 2026 |
Silytics shows public metadata from arXiv and links to the original. Information may be incomplete or out of date. Last refreshed 16 October 2026. Licenses and terms of the original apply to the work itself. Not financial, legal or professional advice.