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Paper · arXiv

Pin It on Anyone: Certified Targeted Displacement of Multi-Bit LLM Watermarks Without the Key

Multi-bit watermarking embeds a message, typically an account identifier, into LLM output so that harmful text can be traced to its origin. We show an attack technique that allows to alter the watermarking message. This allows to, for example, exchange the embedded account ID to an arbitrary different one. The attacker mainly needs access to a few accounts for generating LLM output and model logits, but crucially not the secret key used to watermark. The attacker then rewrites the text, keeping its meaning, so that the watermarking message decoder recovers the watermarking message embedded by the attacker. We are, to our knowledge, the first to propose such an attack, which we call a targ...

AuthorsPaweł Batorski, Przemysław Spurek, Paul Swoboda
Primary categorycs.CR
Published13 October 2026
Last updated at source13 October 2026
cs.CRcs.CL
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