Exact power indices for plurality-voting ensembles
Plurality-voting ensembles aggregate the predictions of multiple base classifiers and output the most voted class, with ties typically broken at random. Despite the simple aggregation rule, attributing the impact of each base classifier to the ensemble's predictions is far from straightforward. That is, a single base classifier's impact depends on how it interacts with the votes of all other classifiers in the ensemble, for example, in resolving ties, and not only on its own predictions. We address the attribution problem using established tools from cooperative game theory, studying the Banzhaf and Shapley power indices for new games modeling plurality voting and random tie-breaking, for...
| Authors | Ilie Sarpe, Theofanis Georgakopoulos, Aristides Gionis |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.LG |
| Published | 13 October 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 13 October 2026 |
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