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Paper · arXiv

Towards a Unified Misuse Monitoring Benchmark

LLM agents increasingly act in multi-actor environments, exposing them to misuse from multiple sources: decomposition attacks, where a harmful request is split into innocuous sub-requests, and prompt injection attacks, where a compromised tool delivers a malicious instruction. Existing evaluations treat these threats separately and ask whether a trajectory is harmful, rather than when it becomes harmful. We propose monitoring the agent's responses, where its actions are externalised, and ask whether the first point where monitors identify harm lands within a harm window (from the agent's first harmful commitment to goal execution). We develop a unified formalism for trace-level misuse mon...

AuthorsAniruddh Pramod, James Oldfield, Adel Bibi
Primary categorycs.CR
Published5 October 2026
Last updated at source5 October 2026
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LG
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