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Paper · arXiv

Controlled Decoding Attacks on Black-Box LLMs

Manipulating next-token probabilities during generation can bypass the safety alignment of large language models. Existing approaches, however, rely on access to model weights or numerical token probabilities and therefore do not apply to interfaces that return only sampled text. Reconstructing probabilities from sampled outputs offers a possible alternative, but finite sampling produces sparse and noisy estimates, while repeating this process at every generation step incurs substantial query costs. Our empirical observations suggest that large distributional changes along successful jailbreak trajectories are concentrated at a small subset of positions, motivating selective control. We i...

AuthorsJesson Wang, Shawn Li, Wei Yang et al.
Primary categorycs.CR
Published29 September 2026
Last updated at source29 September 2026
cs.CRcs.AI
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