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Paper · arXiv

Agentic Commerce Bench: Measuring Fraud Detection for Agents That Spend Money

AI agents now hold spend authority and settle payments without per-action human confirmation. The resulting loss is often not a security failure: a counterparty with the correct domain, the correct settlement address and a genuinely delivered service can charge more than it should, and no check keyed on identity will see it. We present three artefacts for measuring and reducing that loss. First, a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud that separates five observation levels (agent reasoning, wire, settlement rail, counterparty, principal) from the request-level and history-level evidence available at each, and records which levels can observe which attacks. Second, Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB...

AuthorsAnkit Srivastava, Debjyoti Paul
Primary categorycs.CR
Published27 September 2026
Last updated at source27 September 2026
cs.CRcs.AIcs.CY
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