XPhysICS: Cross-Physical-Domain Threat Grounding for Industrial Control Systems Security
Industrial control system attacks are usually documented in terms of the plant where they occurred: its sensors, actuators, process stages, and control logic. Yet many attacks express a more general physical pattern--such as suppressing flow, corrupting chemical dosing, or driving a vessel toward overflow--that may also matter in a different plant. The challenge is deciding when such a threat remains meaningful on a new system rather than relying on similar component names or broad semantic labels. We present XPhysICS, a methodology for grounding documented cyber-physical threats onto a specific target system. XPhysICS converts source evidence into a provenance-linked description of what ...
| Authors | Sangshin Park, Jainta Paul, Lawrence Ponce et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 25 September 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 28 September 2026 |
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