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Paper · arXiv

Adversarial Attacks and Identity Leakage in De-Identification Systems: An Empirical Study

In this paper, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on identity encoders within a realistic de-identification framework. Our experiments show that the transferability of attacks transfers from an external surrogate model to the system model (e.g., CosFace to ArcFace) allows the adversary to cause identity information to leak in a sufficiently sensitive face recognition system. We present experimental evidence and propose strategies to mitigate this vulnerability. Specifically, we show how fine-tuning on adversarial examples helps to mitigate this effect for distortion-based attacks (i.e., snow, fog, etc.), while a simple low-pass filter can attenuate the effect of adversarial ...

AuthorsFelix Rosberg, Cristofer Englund, Eren Erdal Aksoy et al.
Primary categorycs.CV
Published22 September 2026
Last updated at source22 September 2026
cs.CV
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