Strategic Classification Has a Missing Lever: Audit Risk
Strategic classification studies how a decision maker should choose a classifier when the agents being classified can adjust their features in response to it. In existing models, the classifier is the only instrument available to the decision maker, and therefore a feature that is predictive but easy to fake can only be down-weighted or discarded. However, in many settings the decision maker can also verify: lenders verify income, admissions offices check documents, and tax authorities audit returns. In this paper, we propose a model of strategic classification in which the firm jointly designs a linear classifier and an \emph{audit profile}, which assigns to each fakeable feature a proba...
| Authors | Raman Ebrahimi, Massimo Franceschetti |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.GT |
| Published | 18 September 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 18 September 2026 |
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