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Paper · arXiv

Constant regret in general games via higher-order optimism

We introduce an uncoupled learning algorithm which, when employed by all players of an arbitrary $N$-player normal form game with up to $K$ actions per player, guarantees $O(N^3\log^2 K)$ individual regret, uniformly over the horizon of play. The proposed algorithm - which we call higher-order optimism with discounting (HOOD) is a variant of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OptFTRL) that combines a discounted $(N+1)$-th order predictor with entropic regularization over a suitable "lifting" of the game's strategy space. This combination of ingredients is purposefully designed to dampen large oscillations of the induced sequence of play in a controlled manner, removing in this way ...

AuthorsOmar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
Primary categorycs.LG
Published3 September 2026
Last updated at source3 September 2026
cs.LGcs.GT
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