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Paper · arXiv

AgentProv: Auditing Agentic LLM API Providers via Tool-use Policy Probes

Commercial LLM APIs advertise a specific foundation model, but the served backbone may be silently substituted, quantized, or wrapped, for example to save deployment costs. All existing audits decide backbone identity from the text-output channel, which is structurally fragile for agentic APIs because modern serving stacks (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Cloudflare Workers AI, LangGraph) discard text and expose only structured actions when the model calls a tool, and provider-injected system prompts can distort text distributions enough that text-channel tests falsely accuse honest providers of substituting the claimed model. We observe that recent agentic post-training internalizes tool-use ...

AuthorsXun Wang, Bihe Zhao, Michael Backes et al.
Primary categorycs.CR
Published30 August 2026
Last updated at source30 August 2026
cs.CRcs.CLcs.LG
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