Truth Lies Deep: Countering Semantic Camouflage via Latent Intent Verification

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) is often superficial, relying on refusal mechanisms that trigger only at the final stages of generation without erasing the foundational knowledge of harmful concepts acquired during pretraining. This study demonstrates that this architectural disconnect leaves models vulnerable to Semantic Camouflage -- adversarial attacks that wrap harmful intent in benign narrative contexts (e.g., creative writing), effectively bypassing standard input and output guardrails. By analyzing the latent activation trajectories of three distinct Small Language Model (SLM) families (Phi-3, Qwen2.5, and Gemma-2b) under adversarial stress, this research identifie...

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