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Paper · arXiv

The Model's Tell: Measuring Context-Leakage Attack Signals with Behavior Gauges

LLMs increasingly rely on external contexts, such as pre-defined system prompts or retrieved documents, to improve generation quality. However, processing these contexts alongside user queries creates an attack surface: adversarial inputs can induce models to disclose them. Prior probing studies suggest that leakage-related signals emerge in hidden states, yet the need to extract these states poses additional deployment challenges. In this paper, we explore whether this internal signal leaves a more accessible ``tell'' before decoding. We propose LeakGauge, which probes this response by appending a suffix that gauges leakage behavior and mapping its prefill token probabilities to an attac...

AuthorsMaosen Zhang, Jianshuo Dong, Boting Lu et al.
Primary categorycs.CR
Published18 August 2026
Last updated at source18 August 2026
cs.CRcs.AI
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