Breaking Planner Integrity Boundary: Enviroment State-Text Injection Attack on LLM-Driven Embodied Agents
Large language model (LLM)-driven embodied agents rely on environment states to interpret scenes, generate high-level plans, and drive physical execution, making planner-visible state representations a critical security boundary. Existing attacks primarily manipulate user instructions, prompt contexts, model behavior, or perceptual inputs, while paying limited attention to whether environment-state text itself can serve as deceptive task evidence and propagate beyond planning to affect execution outcomes. Because embodied tasks are constrained by entity grounding, action preconditions, spatial relations, and environmental constraints, planning deviation alone does not guarantee adversaria...
| Authors | Jiawei Liu, Jiacheng Guo, Tian Zhang et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.RO |
| Published | 17 August 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 8 September 2026 |
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