Towards Model-based Run-time Cybersecurity: On Control-Flow Anomaly Detection, Attack Identification, and Hardware Monitoring
Methods to increase the resilience of systems to cyber-attacks become increasingly important. Control-flow monitoring provides a principled basis to ensure integrity and detect possible anomalies at run-time. Once anomalies have been detected, so-called attack trees can be used to identify possible types of attacks. However, this approach is vulnerable to camouflage, by which attackers try to evade detection (and correct identification) by deliberately manipulating also the system's observed control flow. In this paper, we outline a model-based approach that provides more robust intrusion detection and attack identification through an architecture that combines software- with hardware-bas...
| Authors | Martin Sachenbacher, Martin Leucker, Alexander Weiss et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 12 August 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 12 August 2026 |
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