A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inference
As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning cons...
| Authors | Alexander Meulemans, Maciej Wołczyk, Marissa A. Weis et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.AI |
| Published | 4 August 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 4 August 2026 |
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