Stable and Budget-Feasible Coalition Formation for Clustered Federated Learning: A Hedonic Potential-Game Approach
Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable. We develop a transferable-surplus model separating learning benefit, system cost, participant cost, and monetary transfers; an allocation rule converts coalition surplus into hedonic preferences, and weak budget feasibility guarantees nonnegative retained coordinator surplus. For symmetric pairwise allocations the induced game is an exact potential game: a Nash-stable partition exists, every strict better-response process conve...
| Authors | Cengis Hasan |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.GT |
| Published | 29 July 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 29 July 2026 |
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