ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&D
As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor to detect covert sabotage before deployment. We evaluate AI control for automated AI R&D with ResearchArena, a framework spanning four long-horizon tasks: safety post-training, capabilities post-training, CUDA-kernel optimization, and inference-server optimization. Because the deliverable in AI R&D is an artifact that will be deployed and run, we pair each main task with two kinds of hidden side task: an embedded ...
| Authors | Lena Libon, Ben Rank, Jehyeok Yeon et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.AI |
| Published | 21 July 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 29 July 2026 |
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