On Incentivized Exploration beyond Bayesianism and Full-Information

We extend Incentive Compatible Exploration beyond the Bayesian full-information setting of Kremer et al. [2014]. We consider agents that may possess external information unknown to the principal. We show such settings require new notions of incentivized exploration, as well as going beyond a Bayesian perspective, and we introduce a definition where agents choose any reasonable (undominated) action. Furthermore, our framework provides for a more robust treatment of ties, and extends to settings where agents lack a single common prior and instead only know that reward distributions belong to a collection of potential priors.

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