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Paper · arXiv

Study on Quantitative Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Belief Revision

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call `$P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call `$P*$'....

AuthorsFelipe Nunes de Souza Camargo
Primary categorycs.AI
Published18 June 2026
Last updated at source18 June 2026
cs.AImath.LO
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