MIDS: Detecting Stealthy Masquerade and Tampering Attacks on CAN Bus via Bidirectional Mamba
The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats. Existing intrusion detection systems are largely tuned to fabrication-style attacks (DoS, fuzzing, ID spoofing realised by frame injection), in which detection signals such as per-ID inter-arrival statistics are readily available. We instead address the harder \emph{masquerade} setting~\cite{b37}, in which an internal adversary substitutes a legitimate frame in-situ at its original transmission slot, preserving traffic periodicity and rendering traffic-statistic defe...
| Authors | Qiqi Liu, Runhan Song, Lei Cui et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 17 June 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 17 June 2026 |
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