SecureClaw: Clawing Back Control of LLM Agents
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene. Existing defenses usually protect one boundary, either the planner/runtime or the point where external actions are executed, and therefore do not by themselves secure both surfaces. We present SecureClaw, a dual-boundary architecture that enforces authorization in a trusted executor and keeps raw protected data outside the LLM runtime. Sensitive reads pass through a trusted gateway that replaces raw values with reference IDs. In the evaluated deployment, the gateway also provides ...
| Authors | Yuhan Ma, Stefan Schmid |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 8 June 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 15 October 2026 |
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