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Paper · arXiv

The Injection Paradox: Brand-Level Suppression in Safety-Trained LLM Recommendations via RAG Context Injection

We present a reproducible failure mode of safety training in RAG-based LLM recommendation, the Injection Paradox, in which prompt injections embedded in retrieved documents backfire against the attacker, suppressing the target brand below the injection-free baseline. In safety-trained Claude models, documents containing prompt injections suffer a sharp drop in recommendation rate, and this suppression propagates beyond the injected document to unmodified documents of the same brand. In Claude Opus 4.6, the target brand drops from a 54% baseline to zero top-2 recommendations across all 50 trials, even though only 1 of 4 brand documents in the corpus contains an injection. The directional p...

AuthorsHyunseok Paeng
Primary categorycs.LG
Published8 June 2026
Last updated at source11 July 2026
cs.LGcs.CLcs.CR
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