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Paper · arXiv

Off-Policy Evaluation with Strategic Agents via Local Disclosure

We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates. Such behavior induces a policy-dependent covariate shift, breaking the standard assumption in existing methods that covariates are exogenous to the policy. Related work addresses this challenge by imposing strong assumptions such as repeated interactions or full knowledge of agents' response behavior, substantially limiting its applicability to OPE. In contrast, we consider a one-shot OPE setting where the decision maker has only partial knowledge of the agents' response behavior. Our key insight is that disclos...

AuthorsKiet Q. H. Vo, Abbavaram Gowtham Reddy, Julian Rodemann et al.
Primary categorycs.AI
Published5 June 2026
Last updated at source5 June 2026
cs.AI
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