Used Car Salesbots? Honesty and Credulity of LLMs as Bargaining Agents under Partial Information
In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether ...
| Authors | Antonio Valerio Miceli-Barone, Vaishak Belle, Shay B. Cohen |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.GT |
| Published | 29 May 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 29 May 2026 |
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