Equilibrium Selection in Multi-Agent Policy Gradients via Opponent-Aware Basin Entry
Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with respect to a target set of equilibria selected by an external criterion, such as payoff dominance. For finite-unroll Meta-MAPG, we show that the update decomposes into ordinary policy gradient plus own-learning and peer-learning corrections, with controlled sampling noise and finite-unroll bias. We identify the peer-learning correction as the main equilibrium-selection mechanism: under a local alignment condition, the probability of entering the certified...
| Authors | Yevhen Shcherbinin, Arina Redina, Maxim Kalpin et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.LG |
| Published | 18 May 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 18 May 2026 |
Silytics shows public metadata from arXiv and links to the original. Information may be incomplete or out of date. Last refreshed 17 October 2026. Licenses and terms of the original apply to the work itself. Not financial, legal or professional advice.