Counterparty Modeling is Not Strategy: The Limits of LLM Negotiators
Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a controlled multi-attribute bargaining environment. We find that current LLM agents can model a counterparty's preferences, but do not reliably turn that knowledge into strategic bargaining. When given negotiating partner preference information, agents model it accurately and early in their reasoning traces, yet this does not reliably improve outcomes for the informed side. Turn-level analyses show why: agents often respond to what they believe the counterpart...
| Authors | Romain Cosentino, Sarath Shekkizhar, Adam Earle et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.AI |
| Published | 15 May 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 15 May 2026 |
Silytics shows public metadata from arXiv and links to the original. Information may be incomplete or out of date. Last refreshed 17 October 2026. Licenses and terms of the original apply to the work itself. Not financial, legal or professional advice.