Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain
Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of ...
| Authors | Hongwei Zhen, Ze Yu, Xin Xiang et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | eess.SY |
| Published | 14 May 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 14 May 2026 |
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