Sign inGet started
Paper · arXiv

Learning to Bid with Unknown Private Values in Budget-Constrained First-Price Auctions

We study the operational problem of automated bidding in repeated first-price auctions under budget and return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. In this setting, an auto-bidder must translate advertiser goals and constraints into real-time bids while learning two latent objects: the causal uplift value of each ad impression and the highest competing bid (HoB) needed to win it. We model uplift values and HoBs through a shared-context Linear Treatment Effect (LTE) structure and analyze both full-information and binary HoB feedback. We develop Dual-LTE, a dual-aware online learning framework that coordinates value estimation, HoB estimation, and budget/RoS control through confidence-guided explora...

AuthorsZihao Hu, Yuxiao Wen, Yuan Yao et al.
Primary categorycs.LG
Published10 May 2026
Last updated at source16 August 2026
cs.LG
Embed this entry
<iframe src="https://silytics.si/embed/item/90fd679e-1a3d-432f-837b-603f421bf25d" width="420" height="190" style="border:0" loading="lazy" title="Silytics entry"></iframe>

Free, no tracking. More about feeds and embeds.

Silytics shows public metadata from arXiv and links to the original. Information may be incomplete or out of date. Last refreshed 17 October 2026. Licenses and terms of the original apply to the work itself. Not financial, legal or professional advice.