Evaluating a Layered Prompt-Injection Defence for the Model Context Protocol: A Record-Level Audit of Decision Conventions, Corpus Provenance and Reproducibility
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) extends the prompt-injection attack surface of large language model applications to tool descriptions, parameter schemas and tool outputs. Defences for it report detection figures that are not comparable, because each is measured on its authors' own corpus under a decision convention that is rarely stated. This paper audits one such evaluation at the level of individual decision records. Its object is CASCADE, a fully local layered defence (rule matching, embedding similarity and an optional local language-model review), run in three configurations on a frozen 5,000-sample corpus under a pinned code revision; the corpus, the per-sample records and the anal...
| Authors | İpek Abasıkeleş Turgut, Edip Gümüş |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CR |
| Published | 18 April 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 2 October 2026 |
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