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Paper · arXiv

Alignment as Institutional Design: From Behavioral Correction to Transaction Structure in Intelligent Systems

Current AI alignment paradigms rely on behavioral correction: external supervisors (e.g., RLHF) observe outputs, judge against preferences, and adjust parameters. This paper argues that behavioral correction is structurally analogous to an economy without property rights, where order requires perpetual policing and does not scale. Drawing on institutional economics (Coase, Alchian, Cheung), capability mutual exclusivity, and competitive cost discovery, we propose alignment as institutional design: the designer specifies internal transaction structures (module boundaries, competition topologies, cost-feedback loops) such that aligned behavior emerges as the lowest-cost strategy for each co...

AuthorsRui Chai
Primary categorycs.CY
Published23 March 2026
Last updated at source23 March 2026
cs.CYcs.AIcs.GTcs.LG
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