Evaluating Cooperation in LLM Social Groups through Elected Leadership
Governing common-pool resources requires agents to develop enduring strategies through cooperation and self-governance to avoid collective failure. While foundation models have shown potential for cooperation in these settings, existing multi-agent research provides little insight into whether structured leadership and election mechanisms can improve collective decision making. The lack of such a critical organizational feature ubiquitous in human society presents a significant shortcoming of the current methods. In this work we aim to directly address whether leadership and elections can support improved social welfare and cooperation through multi-agent simulation with LLMs. We present ...
| Authors | Ryan Faulkner, Anushka Deshpande, David Guzman Piedrahita et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CL |
| Published | 13 April 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 20 April 2026 |
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