Physical Adversarial Attacks on AI Surveillance Systems:Detection, Tracking, and Visible--Infrared Evasion
Physical adversarial attacks are increasingly studied in settings that resemble deployed surveillance systems rather than isolated image benchmarks. In these settings, person detection, multi-object tracking, visible--infrared sensing, and the practical form of the attack carrier all matter at once. This changes how the literature should be read. A perturbation that suppresses a detector in one frame may have limited practical effect if identity is recovered over time; an RGB-only result may say little about night-time systems that rely on visible and thermal inputs together; and a conspicuous patch can imply a different threat model from a wearable or selectively activated carrier. This ...
| Authors | Miguel A. DelaCruz, Patricia Mae Santos, Rafael T. Navarro |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CV |
| Published | 8 April 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 8 April 2026 |
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