Beyond Pessimism: Offline Learning in KL-regularized Games
We study offline learning in KL-regularized two-player zero-sum games, where policies are optimized with respect to a fixed reference policy through KL regularization. Prior work relies on pessimistic value estimation to handle distribution shift, yielding only $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt n)$ statistical rates. We develop a new pessimism-free algorithm and analytical framework for KL-regularized games, built on the smoothness of KL-regularized best responses and a stability property of the Nash equilibrium induced by skew symmetry. This yields, to our knowledge, the first pessimism-free offline learning guarantee for KL-regularized games, with a fast $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ sa...
| Authors | Yuheng Zhang, Claire Chen, Nan Jiang |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.GT |
| Published | 8 April 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 8 May 2026 |
Silytics shows public metadata from arXiv and links to the original. Information may be incomplete or out of date. Last refreshed 17 October 2026. Licenses and terms of the original apply to the work itself. Not financial, legal or professional advice.