Credibility Governance: A Social Mechanism for Collective Self-Correction under Weak Truth Signals
Online platforms increasingly rely on opinion aggregation to allocate real-world attention and resources, yet common signals such as engagement votes or capital-weighted commitments are easy to amplify and often track visibility rather than reliability. This makes collective judgments brittle under weak truth signals, noisy or delayed feedback, early popularity surges, and strategic manipulation. We propose Credibility Governance (CG), a mechanism that reallocates influence by learning which agents and viewpoints consistently track evolving public evidence. CG maintains dynamic credibility scores for both agents and opinions, updates opinion influence via credibility-weighted endorsements...
| Authors | Wanying He, Yanxi Lin, Ziheng Zhou et al. |
|---|---|
| Primary category | cs.CY |
| Published | 3 March 2026 |
| Last updated at source | 3 March 2026 |
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